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Mixed Companies as Local Utilities 
 
 
Abstract: 
The use of public-private partnership arrangements by public authorities has been a hot 
topic in recent literature. Both practitioners and academics stress the need to expose best 
practices and develop guidelines to cope with these complex governance structures. 
Nonetheless, research on the specific case of mixed companies (institutionalised public-
private partnerships) has been somewhat neglected. This paper discusses the rationale 
behind the use of these arrangements by local governments. Although theoretically the 
model has some merits, in practice it usually fails in protecting the public interest. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The increasingly strict limits on debt imposed on local and regional governments (in 
Europe and elsewhere) forced most decision-makers to consider the use of private 
money to fund public infrastructure (Hodge, 2004). Simultaneously, the decentralisation 
reforms observed globally made sub-national governments responsible for the provision 
of a significant number of public services. These two conflicting forces resulted in a 
move from traditional public procurement towards public-private partnership (PPP) 
arrangements. The models of direct public production do not always provide the 
flexibility sought by local politicians (e.g. in terms of human resource management, 
contracting out parts of the service, etc.) and sometimes are considered inefficient or 
unable to provide value-for-money (Shleifer, 1998). Nonetheless, recent studies show 
that private production is not necessarily cheaper and that additional emphasis should be 
placed on the regulatory framework rather than on the make or buy dilemma (Bel et al., 
2010). 
 
To be precise, PPP arrangements are more than just alternative procurement procedures. 
When entering in this type of agreements, a local government is not simply seeking the 
construction of an infrastructure but is also looking for the delivery of the general-
interest services associated with that infrastructure. Hence, PPP agreements work as 
governance structures for the production of public infrastructure services (Hodge and 
Greve, 2010). To benefit from the attractive features of these arrangements (such as the 
off-balance sheet treatment, EPEC, 2010), local governments must certify that: (1) the 
private partner contributes with equity (and not just debt, to ensure real commitment), 
(2) the agreement represents a long-term relationship (adopting a whole life-cycle 
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approach where the private partner should be remunerated directly by customers 
through fees), and (3) the private partners bear a significant amount of risks (whenever 
the private sector is better prepared to manage them, thus reducing the economic cost of 
each risk). 
 
There are two main types of PPP arrangements (European Commission, 2004a). In a 
purely contractual type (cPPP) the private partner is solely responsible for the 
production of the services and its rights and duties are thoroughly established in a 
written contract (transactional approach to governance). Concessions are the most 
common governance models within this type of PPP, although some other arrangements 
might occur at the local level (e.g. afférmage and management contracts, for detail see 
Marques and Berg, 2010). On the other hand, institutionalised PPPs (iPPPs) consist of 
mixed capital firms (joint ventures) where the public and private partners gather to 
jointly manage and produce the services (relational approach to governance). 
 
The mixed company model appears as an alternative both to the traditional public 
production and to the delegation of utility services to private firms through concession 
contracts (Marra, 2007). Although in Italy and Spain mixed companies are now 
widespread in several infrastructure sectors (and their presence is becoming more 
significant in other countries, e.g. France, Portugal and Germany), this is a relatively 
new model for procuring, financing and manage utility services (gas, electricity, water, 
urban waste, urban transportations, etc.). Government ownership can be direct or 
indirect (when a publicly-owned entity other than the municipality owns the shares) and 
the process usually takes place with the local government creating a municipal company 
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and then selling part of the shares to a private investor (preferably, in the EU, the 
winning bidder of a public tender). The selected private investor is then precluded from 
selling its shares to a third party unless the public authority gives such authorisation and 
both free competition and transparency principles are secured. 
 
In spite of these definitions, in PPP agreements there are no prêt à porter procedures. 
Due to problems of “bounded rationality” (Williamson, 2002), the long-term character 
of these arrangements renders PPP contracts necessarily incomplete (thus, prone to ex-
post opportunism). The failures of regulatory contracts (disputes with operators, 
bankruptcy, decreased quality of service, renegotiation of contracts with clear damage 
to the public interest, etc.) emphasise the need for local decision-makers to understand 
the strengths and weaknesses of every governance structure at hand. 
 
This paper scrutinises the use of mixed companies by local governments for the 
production of public infrastructure services, providing a concise overview of the 
strengths and limitations of these arrangements. It concludes that the municipalities that 
wish to adopt this strategy should devote special attention to contract management. 
Usually, the payment mechanisms devised do not expose the private partners to any 
type of risk (in fact, downside risks are often transferred to customers). In addition, 
since public authorities have effective responsibility in the daily management of the 
services, there are no incentives for the application of financial sanctions to the 
companies in case of poor performance. 
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2. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES’ REASONING 
Currently, the empirical literature on iPPP arrangements is still scarce, especially 
regarding the thorough analysis of real case-studies. The scrutiny of tender and 
contractual documents from four Portuguese local iPPP agreements (Cruz and Marques, 
2012), the analysis of the operating costs and investments made by public-private Italian 
water utilities (Marra, 2007), and the Resource Book on PPP Case Studies (European 
Commission, 2004b) are among the few exceptions. Despite this lack of attention, 
mixed (municipal) companies have a substantial presence in the EU. Indeed there are 
now hundreds of these entities operating at the local level mainly in Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, France, Germany, Hungary, Greece, and Sweden (Verdier et al., 2004). In 
addition to a strong presence in Europe, local mixed companies are also found in Latin 
America (mostly in Colombia but also in Cuba and Mexico, Marin, 2009). 
 
Usually, these companies deliver local infrastructure services, including utility services 
such as drinking water supply, wastewater collection and treatment, urban waste 
collection and treatment and energy supply. Since these services entail non-recoverable 
investments in infrastructure with a high degree of asset specificity (sunk costs) and 
because there is necessarily uncertainty involved (inherent to long-term agreements), 
dealing with a private investor might lead to a complex situation of bilateral monopoly. 
Hence, with the mixed company model, local decision-makers try to lessen the 
problems of incomplete contracts and solve disputes at the core (i.e. in the board of 
directors) without the use of litigation or arbitration (adopting a relational contracting 
approach, Reeves, 2008). This is in line with the “alliance model” of PPP arrangements, 
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where a “process management” strategy is implemented to cope with complexity 
(Edelenbos and Teisman, 2008). 
 
The reasons for a local government to opt for a PPP arrangement instead of direct 
(municipal services) or indirect (100 per cent public municipal companies) public 
production are well known and discussed elsewhere (e.g. see McQuaid and Scherrer, 
2010). One of the drivers influencing the choice of local politicians towards mixed 
companies is the ability to keep control over the services. Indeed, in most cases, the 
public authority owns the majority of the shares (typically 51 per cent), thus retaining 
the dominant influence (e.g. see Bognetti and Robotti, 2007, Cruz and Marques, 2011, 
González-Gómez et al., 2009, Oelmann, 2009, Verdier et al., 2004). Generally, this 
participation is achieved by monetising the existing public infrastructure that is 
allocated to the company (e.g. in water and urban waste utilities regardless of the 
current state of conservation of the systems). Different ownership structures (where the 
private partners hold the majority) usually denote objectives other than managing 
general-interest services (that would not be produced or would be produced under 
different conditions if there was no public intervention). However, in the EU, the 
“proper scope for government” does not include profit-seeking activities (at least in 
principle). 
 
By choosing an iPPP arrangement, local governments keep the services at arm’s length 
and benefit from the private sector’s know-how, but still aim at steering the companies 
towards (unprofitable) social goals (such as improved quality and equitable fees). The 
ownership allows the public partner to gather more (and better) information and to have 
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a say regarding the actual management of the firm (Marra, 2007). In fact, this model is 
not seen as a “normal” privatisation and this has some political advantages (e.g. less 
public contestation, the capacity to appoint “political managers”, etc.). 
 
Another, and perhaps more important, reason to choose a mixed company over any 
other alternative is the possibility of receiving an up-front payment from the private 
investor. To acquire a (usually minority) stake in the share capital of the firm, the 
winning bidder of the public tender has to buy the shares at an interesting price for the 
municipality (this process is often considered to be a partial privatisation, Bortolotti et 
al., 2003). This gives an opportunity for local governments to obtain what is actually a 
“loan” that does not add up to the severe debt limits imposed on them. 
 
 
3. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Despite being a relational agreement, where the “spirit of the contract” should prevail 
over the “letter of the contract” (Macneil, 1974), the scope for action of both public and 
private partners in an iPPP is crystallised in a complex web of contracts (figure 1). The 
documents that constitute the actual regulatory contracts of mixed firms are the 
shareholders’ agreements (firmed between the partners and setting their rights and 
duties), the management contracts (firmed between the companies and the competent 
public authorities, setting the objectives to be attained) and the statutes (setting the 
internal rules of the companies). Hence, to benefit from the increased flexibility that an 
iPPP can provide to cope with uncertainty, local governments ought to craft an optimal 
regulatory framework for the mixed companies (Kayaga and Zhe, 2007). This 
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framework should encompass market access issues (the award criteria and methodology 
must lead to choosing the best bidder and not the most optimistic or generous) and 
contract monitoring issues (the public partner must have means to evaluate the 
observance of the contractual clauses by the private partner and effective power to issue 
rewards/sanctions when appropriate). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Typical contractual framework of local mixed companies 
 
 
One of the most important theoretical strongpoints of mixed companies is the increased 
access of the public partner to valuable information regarding the day-to-day operations 
(reduced information and monitoring costs due to property rights). Indeed, the 
ownership should reduce asymmetric information (a serious shortcoming of cPPP 
arrangements) and allow public authorities to cope with principal-agent problems 
through “internal regulation” (Marra, 2007), thus curbing the risk of ex-post 
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opportunistic behaviour (and balancing the relative bargaining power of the sides in 
case of renegotiation). 
 
In spite of being accurate to say that information costs can be reduced (and thus the 
public authority is better able to know the location of the production frontier, curbing 
monitoring costs), one cannot provide a general verdict regarding the overall transaction 
costs involved with mixed companies (which include the ones incurred during the 
procurement phase). Indeed, the complexity of mixed firms calls for comprehensive ex-
ante costs (and particular expertise, for instance in the preparation of all the draft 
contracts and articles of association) even though, in theory, ex-post coordination costs 
may be lower for this model when compared to purely private production (e.g. 
concessions). Moreover, ex-ante costs could be curbed if local governments are able to 
consult standard tender documents, template agreements or “best practice contracts” 
(e.g. see NDFA, 2007 and PViS, 2009). 
 
Due to the increased pressure for commercial viability that comes with private sector 
participation, mixed companies seem to attain better results than public companies in 
terms of financial performance (although private companies still perform better in this 
regard, Boardman and Vining, 1989). Nevertheless, a superior overall efficiency of 
general-interest services is not necessarily associated with extremely good figures 
regarding financial indicators and it depends on many other factors besides the 
ownership structure. The rationale behind mixed companies is to find the perfect 
equilibrium between efficiency and social concerns. The idea is to merge the private 
sector objectives of profit maximisation (incentives for cost-efficiency) with the public 
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sector objectives of consumer satisfaction (incentives for equity and quality), thus 
maximising the overall welfare. 
 
In theory, if reducing costs is likely to cause (for social reasons) an unacceptable decline 
in quality, then public ownership might be preferable; otherwise, if improving quality 
may lead to substantial cost increases, private ownership can be more attractive 
(Schmitz, 2000). Partial privatisation could then be optimal when both problems 
coexist. However, it is not clear that iPPPs prevent over-investments or even higher 
costs, for instance, with outsourcing (usually carried out by one of the private partner’s 
companies). In fact, some argue that firms jointly owned by the government and private 
investors may result in the worst of both worlds, where neither profitable nor social 
goals are successfully achieved (Eckel and Vining, 1985). This dreadful outcome can 
have different origins. First, for the information to flow upward (to more informed and 
effective regulators) it is required that public representatives hold high expertise and 
ethical standards (Marra, 2007). Second, in addition to the expected contradictory 
pressures within the company, a high degree of managerial “cognitive dissonance” 
might occur if there is ownership dispersion (which is unlikely in European mixed 
companies operating at a local level) or a lack of clear and stable objectives (Boardman 
and Vining, 1989). And third, social output is hard to measure, thereby hindering the 
assessment regarding the degree of success of this governance model (and, broadly 
speaking, the factual benchmarking of public, mixed and private companies). 
 
For the reasons stated, mixed companies are more likely to appear when the external 
environment exerts contradictory pressures (some pushing towards purely public, others 
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to purely private governance models). Indeed, some empirical research confirms that 
public authorities prefer this model when both financial constraints and contracting 
costs are high (Bel and Fageda, 2010). Sometimes, mixed companies are even seen by 
local governments as a “stand-by solution” or a form of “gradual privatisation” 
(Bognetti and Robotti, 2007). However, there is a risk that this model is perceived by 
local decision-makers as a second best alternative, when neither fully public (for 
financial reasons) nor fully private (for social reasons or unacceptable coordination 
costs) are feasible. 
 
 
4. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Typically, the private partners in local iPPPs are, or have ties with, construction 
companies (this also applies to cPPP arrangements). In the utilities sector, these partners 
also tend to be large international corporations that are specialised in the field and have 
great market share; for example, the case of Veolia and RWE in Berliner 
Wasserbetriebe (a mixed company in charge of water services in Berlin, Oelmann et al., 
2009) and Suez in ACEA (a mixed company in charge of water and energy services in 
Rome, Carrozza, 2010). While public authorities retain some degree of control at the 
strategic level (by holding the majority of the votes in the shareholders’ meetings and 
therefore being able to perform their regulatory duties), day-to-day operations are 
usually carried out by the private partners (Bel and Fageda, 2010). 
 
According to EU legislation, mixed companies (and, quite often, 100 per cent public 
municipal companies) operate under private commercial law which allows them to have 
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some flexibility (for instance, regarding human resource management) while precluding 
them to be treated as in-house management (see European Commission, 2008). 
However, very often municipal companies (either mixed or public) are not primarily 
designed to deliver high profits (Cruz and Marques, 2011). In addition, there would be 
huge political costs if the tariffs of essential services (that are public monopolies) were 
not set to achieve break-even or even a small surplus. Hence, with this governance 
model, private investors are usually remunerated through costs (that are diluted in the 
tariffs charged to customers) and attracted by the perspective of future transactions (or 
lateral contracts, Brux, 2010). Proceeding in this manner, the company respects the EU 
rules and avoids taxes on profits. The private partner is paid by the mixed company for 
the construction and/or maintenance of the required infrastructures and also for the 
consultancy of its parent company. This situation can lead to the so-called “Averch-
Johnson” effect, since the private investors increase profits if the mixed company 
overinvests (and/or contracts out more services to one of the companies owned by those 
investors). The intricacy of the payment mechanisms hampers transparency (leading to 
public distrust) and makes contract management an extremely difficult task. 
 
In practice, there are several aspects that can render this PPP model as sub-optimal. 
First of all, local governments are frequently tempted to work out some figures (to make 
the PPP alternative pass the viability tests) and to be overly optimistic when considering 
aspects such as demand and the quality of assets (to get higher up-front payments when 
selling the shares). The bidders are asked to develop a business-case where they set the 
tariffs based on certain conditions of demand, investments, regulatory requirements, etc. 
However, these tariffs change if some indicators suffer (sometimes small) variations to 
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what was initially forecasted. Indeed, the complex web of contracts usually identifies 
multiple situations where the financial and economic equilibrium of the companies must 
be restored (by reviewing the tariffs). In fact, the internal rate of return (IRR) of the 
project is always secured and risks are passed to consumers (Marques and Berg, 2011). 
There are three main reasons for this: (1) local governments are likely to be lured by the 
amount of the up-front payments and the bid assessment methodology often leads to 
selecting the most optimistic rather than the best bidder (a phenomenon labelled as the 
winners’ curse, Reeves, 2008); (2) even if the public partner is better informed in a 
relational arrangement, during renegotiations there is no pressure from competitors and 
the prices asked by the private partner tend to detach from production costs (Bajari et 
al., 2006); (3) public authorities have the duty to perform an effective contract 
monitoring yet, since decision-makers from the public sector are actively involved in 
the management of the services, local governments have disincentives to apply 
sanctions against themselves and thus tend to agree with proposals to raise tariffs. 
Hence, it seems that only apparently local governments are in the driving seat of mixed 
companies and genuine accountability is lost through fuzzy lines of authority. It is 
indeed a peculiar governance structure where the public sector is both a “referee” and a 
“player” (Cruz and Marques, 2012). 
 
The existence of an external regulator can help to avert these problems. Nonetheless, 
there are no sector-specific regulators for some utility services in several member states 
(for instance urban transportation, waste management and even water services in 
Europe). Even in countries with capable regulatory agencies, their powers are somewhat 
limited since economic regulation can interfere with the local autonomy principles. The 
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solution to circumvent regulatory capture lies with the definition of strict corporate 
governance rules that clearly define the scope for action of each partner (OECD, 2010). 
For instance, Marra (2007) argues that if this is accomplished, mixed companies can 
undertake higher investments (arguably resulting in higher quality standards) and attain 
lower running costs than totally public utilities. 
 
One additional drawback of mixed companies relates to the fact that both public and 
private sector representatives have greater experience and accumulated know-how 
regarding cPPP arrangements (when compared with the difficulties  of crafting an 
optimal relational agreement). Furthermore, procurement procedures in cPPP 
agreements bear a greater resemblance to the traditional public procurement. On the 
other hand, there is a greater number of concessions already operating at the local level 
and some lessons were learned (e.g. see Regan et al., 2011). In iPPP arrangements, the 
actors still have a blurred perception of their objectives, roles and proper conduct (Cruz 
and Marques, 2012). 
 
Finally, one encouraging outcome of partial privatisation that emerges from empirical 
observation seems to be its positive correlation with the exploitation of economies of 
scale and scope (Bognetti and Robotti, 2007, Bel and Fageda, 2010). PPP arrangements 
seem to work as a means that allows for inter-municipal cooperation and mixed 
companies avoid giving up completely the control of essential utility services. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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The use of mixed companies by local governments to deliver urban infrastructure 
services and its mechanisms of governance remain relatively unknown both to 
practitioners and academics. To make an informed decision, local politicians should 
consider the advantages and disadvantages of every available governance structure. 
Although the “traditional” publicly-owned entities offer greater discretion to municipal 
executives, the growing need for an efficient management and for models that are able 
to cope with harsh financial restrictions should lead to “credible contracting modes that 
possess adaptive attributes located between classical markets and hierarchies” 
(Williamson, 2002: 181). Nevertheless, local governments must first determine during 
the viability studies whether the PPP alternative is preferred to in-house delivery and 
traditional procurement (see figure 2). This is usually carried out through the calculation 
of a public sector comparator (a benchmark value for the project–typically, the expected 
cost of in-house delivery), which allows the decision makers to identify the model that 
provides better value for money (Marques and Berg, 2010). 
 
The main differences between cPPP and iPPP models relate to contract management. 
Mixed companies have a very complex regulatory framework consisting of an endless 
number of documents (and sometimes an external regulator). The web of contracts of 
this governance structure sometimes makes the payment mechanisms obscure and the 
contract management fairly complex. Moreover, in an iPPP, disincentives are created 
towards the application of sanctions due to failures in the day-to-day management or 
breaches of contracts. Indeed, the public partner would experience a form of self-
punishment (Marques and Berg, 2011). The conflicts of interest appear because local 
governments assume the role of both regulator and regulatee (Schaeffer and Loveridge, 
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2002). According to a growing body of literature and also to the insights from 
practitioners, public sector entities should acknowledge their natural propensity and 
position themselves as strong and effective regulators—with the responsibility and 
capability of monitoring the performance of the services rather than producing them 
(Savas, 2000). Nonetheless, this seems difficult to achieve when the government is 
actively involved in the management (although we do not consider it unfeasible). In 
concessions to private companies contract management is necessarily less 
complex/subjective. On the other hand, it is true that, in this case, the importance of the 
letter of the (incomplete) PPP contract is amplified and any fluctuations in the 
assumptions made during the procurement phase can result in the premature 
renegotiation of the agreement (which is likely to damage the public interest, Guasch, 
2004). 
 
Most production risks, such as the ones connected with the design and construction of 
public infrastructure, as well as commercial risks, such as demand and capacity, should 
necessarily have a lower economic cost when allocated to the private sector since, at 
least technically, it is better prepared to manage and mitigate them. This goal can only 
be achieved if there is an explicit transference of risk to the private partner (Grimsey 
and Lewis, 2005). As we have seen, this is not by all means a simple task and in mixed 
companies risks are prone to be transferred to customers (Marques and Berg, 2011). 
 
In fact, as illustrated in figure 2, the use of mixed companies should be confined to 
cases of extreme uncertainty and complexity associated with the infrastructure services 
and municipalities in question. In these cases it would make sense to adopt a relational 
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governance model where, more important than the written contractual clauses, one 
should underscore the spirit of the contract and a contractual relationship guided by 
mutual trust, altruism and strategic alliance (Edelenbos and Teisman, 2008). Yet, we do 
not think that this description fits the majority of the cases in local utilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed companies will hardly embody the next panacea for local governments’ financial 
hurdles. To provide this model with greater capabilities from the public interest point of 
view, public authorities should adopt measures to circumvent conflicts of interest (e.g. 
by educating local decision-makers concerning the proper scope for their action) and 
Viability studies 
demonstrate that the PPP 
model is preferred 
 
Is the project 
particularly complex 
and subject to extreme 
uncertainty? 
cPPP 
NO 
YES iPPP 
(…) 
Key steps to success: 
• During the procurement phase, emphasize the 
robustness of the bidders’ business models 
(rather than the short-term financial benefits); 
• Design a sound contract management 
framework; 
• Clearly define and regulate the roles and 
powers of “public” and “private” managers or 
representatives; 
• Clearly define the major principles and 
guidelines that must be followed during 
future disagreements; 
• Ensure that it is not possible to raise tariffs 
due to changes in parameters of risk factors 
allocated to the private partner. 
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realign priorities (e.g. by diverting weight from the up-front payments towards other 
aspects such as the robustness of the business models presented by the private partners). 
 
Some authors conclude that this model is often a second best alternative, when neither 
pure public models that should maximise social output nor pure private models that 
should maximise cost-efficiency are feasible (Boardman et al., 1986). However, the 
desire to bundle efficiency and social objectives and find an optimal commitment is 
praiseworthy. In fact, although only a few early studies have been conducted so far, 
mixed companies seem to perform well in the Italian water sector (Bognetti and 
Robotti, 2007, Marra, 2007) where utilities are usually large and vertically integrated 
(including both retail and wholesale segments of the market). If a large number of 
contiguous municipalities show interest in exploiting economies of scale, the iPPP 
model could gain relevance and have greater attractiveness since the larger complexity 
could increase uncertainty and render transactional contracting inefficient (increasing 
the completeness of the contract would entail prohibitive transaction costs).  
 
Taking into account what is stated by the literature and the real constraints imposed on 
local governments, it is reasonable to conclude that mixed companies have some fine 
theoretical capabilities even if the drawbacks outweigh the benefits in most cases. In the 
authors’ opinion, future research on mixed companies should focus on three main areas: 
(1) the thorough analysis of real case studies at an international level. This should 
include the analysis of the regulatory environment, the scrutiny of the procurement 
procedures and the review of the contract monitoring instruments devised; (2) the 
performance evaluation of mixed companies in a comparative perspective. Mixed 
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companies should be compared with other governance models regarding efficiency, 
effectiveness and other outcomes; (3) the development of a corporate governance 
framework specially designed for mixed public-private capital companies. The set of 
rules and policies should be flexible enough to enable a relational long-term agreement 
and, at the same time, capable of protecting the public interest at all times. 
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Figure 1 – Typical contractual framework of local mixed companies 
Figure 2 – The decision flow leading to the choice of the iPPP model and the key steps 
to success of mixed companies 
